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The language of thought
as a logically perfect language
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Abstract
Between the end of the nineteenth century and the first twenty years of the
twentieth century, stimulated by the impetuous development of logical studies
and taking inspiration from Leibniz’s idea of a characteristica universalis, the three
founding fathers of the analytic tradition in philosophy, i.e., Frege, Russell, and
Wittgenstein, started to talk of a logically perfect language, as opposed to natural
languages, all feeling that the latter were inadequate to their (different) philosophical
purposes. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the very idea of a
logically perfect language ceased for various reasons to seem attractive to analytic
philosophers. Thus, it might appear that this idea could be classified together with
the many other bizarre ideas that from time to time surface in the history of
philosophy – an idea that perhaps had a beneficial impact on the development of
twentieth century logic, but which can now be put to rest. In this brief note, I
contend that this conclusion may be too hasty. Indeed, if a well–known empirical
hypothesis advanced in  by Jerry Fodor turns out to be true, then there is a
logically perfect language, after all. More precisely, I argue that, if it exists, Fodor’s
language of thought possesses the main characteristics a logically perfect language is
required to have.
Keywords: Language of thought; Logically perfect language; Logical form; Analysis; Under-
standing.
.
As is well known, the search for a (sometimes, the) perfect language, which
Umberto Eco () quite convincingly showed to be a recurring theme
in Western culture, acquired a specific form in the hands of a group of
philosophers working between the end of the nineteenth century and the
first twenty years or so of the twentieth century. Indeed, stimulated by
the impetuous development of logical studies and taking inspiration from
Leibniz’s idea of a characteristica universalis, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
and Ludwig Wittgenstein, namely the three founding fathers of the analytic
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tradition in philosophy, started to talk, each in his own way, of a logically
perfect language. In fact, they all felt natural languages to be inadequate to
certain philosophical purposes they had. Natural languages are affected
by vagueness and ambiguity (both lexical and structural), and they contain
expressions apparently without reference (“Pegasus”). Because of this, they
can easily lead to mistakes in reasoning. In Über Sinn und Bedeutung, after
presenting a problematic case for his account of subordinate clauses, Frege
for example comments:
This arises from an imperfection of language, from which even the symbolic
language of mathematical analysis is not altogether free; even there combinations
of symbols can occur that seem to stand for [bedeuten] something but (at least so
far) are bedeutungslos, e.g. divergent infinite series. [. . . ] A logically perfect language
[eine logisch vollkommene Sprache] (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions, that
every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs
already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that no new sign shall be
introduced as a proper name without being secured a Bedeutung. The logic books
contain warnings against logical mistakes arising from the ambiguity of expressions.
I regard as no less pertinent a warning against apparent proper names that have
no Bedeutung. The history of mathematics supplies errors which have arisen in this
way. This lends itself to demagogic abuse as easily as ambiguity – perhaps more
easily. ‘The will of the people’ can serve as an example; for it is easy to establish
that there is at any rate no generally accepted Bedeutung for this expression. It is
therefore by no means unimportant to eliminate the source of these mistakes, at
least in science, once and for all. Then such objections as the one discussed above
would become impossible (Frege, , p. ).
One can find similar observations in Russell’s writings, and in Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus. Russell, in particular, insisted on many occasions, starting
from On Denoting (), on the fact that the surface grammar of a sentence
may mislead us: it is not immediately evident, for example, that a sentence
such as “The queen of England is aged” involves a quantification. For these
philosophers, a logically perfect language would be one not having any of
these defects of natural language. In fact, «[a] logically perfect language
has rules of syntax which prevent nonsense, and has single symbols which
. For more on the uses that have been made of the idea of a logically perfect language in the
analytic tradition, see H ().
. According to Andrea Iacona, another alleged defect of natural languages is that some of its
expressions are context sensitive. In contrast, he claims, «a logically perfect language is free from
context sensitivity» (, p. ). This, however, seems dubious to me. I do not see any reason why a
logically perfect language should not count indexicals and demostratives among its expressions. In
fact, Russell went so far as to write that «[t]he only words one does use as names in the logical sense
are words like ‘this’ or ‘that’» (–, p. ).
. For a discussion of Russell’s On Denoting relating it to the idea of a logically perfect language,
see K () and M ().
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always have a definite and unique meaning» (Russell, , p. X). Hence,
any such language would not be affected by vagueness and lexical or struc-
tural ambiguity, it would not contain expressions without reference, and it
would be such that the inferential potential of any sentence – the logical
relations of any sentence with any other sentence – is not hidden, so to
speak. In a word, it would be a language in which there is no mismatch
between syntactic structure and logical form. And, of course, it would be
a language capable of expressing everything that can be expressed: for any
meaningful sentence of a natural language there would be a sentence of
the logically perfect language having exactly the same (truth–conditional)
meaning. Actually, Frege dreamed of building an artificial language with
such characteristics: his Begriffsschrift was meant to be a first step in this di-
rection. And, some years later, Russell made some further steps. As he wrote
in the second lecture of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, «[t]he language
which is set forth in Principia Mathematica [the book on the foundations of
mathematics he wrote together with Alfred Whitehead] [. . . ] aims at being
that sort of language that, if you add a vocabulary, would be a logically
perfect language» (Russell, –, p. ). Interestingly for my purpose
here, the passage continues in the following way:
Actual languages are not logically perfect in this sense, and they cannot possibly
be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life. A logically perfect language, if it
could be constructed [Note the caution here, as well as in the passage quoted in
the preceding footnote], would not only be intolerably prolix, but, as regards its
vocabulary, would be very largely private to one speaker (ibidem).
Now, there is no doubt that with their work related to these issues
Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein made long–lasting contributions to both
philosophy and logic. The fact is, however, that the very idea of a logically
perfect language soon ceased for various reasons to seem attractive to
analytic philosophers – as is well known, Wittgenstein himself changed
his mind on this. To use Richard Rorty’s () apt terminology, “Ideal
Language Philosophy” was quickly supplanted by “Ordinary Language
Philosophy”. And even those philosophers who, like W. V. Quine, were not
hostile to formal methods and took the logical regimentation of natural
language to be helpful for doing science, stopped dreaming about a logically
. It is perhaps worth noting here that this passage immediately precedes the one with Russell’s
famous, and contested, interpretation of the aim of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: «Mr Wittgenstein is
concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language – not that any language is logically
perfect, or that we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a logically perfect
language, but that the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfils this function
in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language which we postulate» (ibidem).
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perfect language: we can perhaps improve a bit on natural languages, but
that is all.
Thus, it may seem that the idea of a logically perfect language can be
classified together with the many other bizarre ideas that from time to time
surface in the history of philosophy – an idea that perhaps had a beneficial
impact on the development of twentieth century logic, but which can now
be put to rest. We must just take what we have, natural languages with all
their logical imperfections, because there is, and there can be, no logically
perfect language.
.
But is it really so? In this brief note, I want to suggest that no, perhaps it is
not. Perhaps, there is a logically perfect language, after all. And, if there is,
it is not a fancy artificial language that some extremely smart logician has
been able to construct. Not at all. On the contrary, it is a language that we
all have, and have always had, at our disposal, and that we use constantly,
even though it is not a natural language, at least if a natural language is a
spoken, or otherwise public, language.
More precisely, what I want to contend is that if a well–known empirical
hypothesis advanced in  by Jerry Fodor turns out to be true, then there is
a logically perfect language. The hypothesis comes in the area of what Fodor
(, pp. VII–IX) calls “speculative psychology”. In the last few decades
it has informed thousands of studies in the cognitive sciences, and is still
alive – it has fierce opponents, but also staunch defenders. In a nutshell,
the hypothesis says that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized
in the brain. This symbolic system is like a language in many respects – in
particular, it has a syntax and a (truth–conditional) semantics. No wonder,
then, that Fodor called it the “language of thought”. My claim is simply that,
if it exists, the language of thought is a logically perfect language, since in
order to play the roles it is supposed to play in Fodor’s theory (the so–called
representational theory of mind) it has to have the main characteristics that a
logically perfect language is required to have: there must be no mismatch
between syntactic structure and logical form, and it has to be capable of
expressing everything that can be expressed, without any ambiguity.
. Generally, the hypothesis is rejected by those who oppose functionalism in philosophy
of mind and classical computationalism in cognitive sciences, such as eliminative materialists (e.g.,
C, ), connectionists (e.g., C, ; see also the essays collected in M and
M, ), and embodied cognition theorists (e.g., B, , P, , C, ,
and C, ). But functionalism and classical computationalism are still alive and well. See
B () for some critical considerations on Prinz’s book.
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As far as I know, Fodor never mentions the idea of a logically perfect
language. In fact, he arrives at the idea of a language of thought through
entirely different considerations. Thus, in a sense it is a striking coincidence
that he found exactly what Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein were searching
for. Nevertheless, it is surprising to my eyes that almost no one noticed
this coincidence. Both Frege’s, Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s considerations
related to the idea of a logically perfect language and Fodor’s considerations
related to the idea of a language of thought are well known among analytic
philosophers, but none of them seem to have connected them. Indeed,
it is curious that the only work I am aware of reaching conclusions to a
certain extend similar to mine comes from a semiotician rather than an
analytic philosopher. In fact, at the time when Eco was working on his
book on perfect languages, one of his students, Giovanna Cosenza, wrote
her PhD dissertation on Fodor’s hypothesis. The title of the dissertation
was Il linguaggio del pensiero come lingua perfetta (“The language of thought
as a perfect language”). Cosenza summarizes the conclusions she drew
there in an article with the same title published in Versus (). Basically,
she construes Fodor’s language of thought as a perfect language similar to
those theorized in the seventeenth century by philosophers such as Francis
Bacon, George Dalgarno, and John Wilkins. As should be clear by now, I
believe Cosenza was quite right, and I see myself as simply elaborating on
her suggestions. The only difference is that I focus on Frege’s, Russell’s,
and Wittgenstein’s projects, which Cosenza did not discuss, rather than on
Bacon’s, Dalgarno’s, and Wilkins’. On the one hand, they are projects I am
far more familiar with. On the other, it seems to me that Fodor’s language
of thought, if it exists, is not just a perfect language in a generic sense, but
specifically a logically perfect language: as I mentioned above, it has almost
all the characteristics that make a language perfect from a logical point of
view.
Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to go into details and to
explain why Fodor’s language of thought, if it exists at all, must have all
these characteristics. Very briefly, what is crucial is that, according to Fodor’s
representational theory of mind, mental processes (transitions from mental
states to mental states) are computations over sentences of the language
of thought. These sentences have semantic properties (truth–conditions),
but the computations are sensitive only to their syntactic properties. Under
these assumptions, the rationality of our mental processes can only be
explained by the fact that the syntactic properties of the language of thought
. I say “almost” because according to R (–, p. ) a logically perfect language does
not allow for synonymity («In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for
every simple object»), whereas according to Fodor the language of thought does. However, it seems
dubious to me that a language allowing for synonymity should ipso facto count as logically imperfect.
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sentences mirror their semantic properties, which means, roughly, that their
syntactic structure is their logical form.
.
Rather than elaborating on this, I will proceed by briefly considering the
relation that, according to Russell, natural language sentences bear to the
thoughts we express by them, which should allow us to see from a different
perspective the connection between Russell’s idea of a logically perfect
language and Fodor’s idea of a language of thought. Russell’s theory of
thought is based on his adoption of the so–called Principle of Acquaintance,
which he states in various places. Here is the version from The Problems
of Philosophy: «Every proposition which we can understand must be composed
wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted» (Russell, , p. ). In
this formulation, «every proposition which we can understand» means every
thought which we can have or every content which we can entertain in thinking.
In a nutshell, Russell’s idea is that we think by mentally combining, so to
speak, certain entities with which we have a special direct and immediate
cognitive relation he calls “acquaintance”. These entities are the primitives
of our thoughts, and the mode by which they are combined in a thought
is its logical form. Due to his empiricist epistemology, however, Russell
believed that we cannot be acquainted with material entities such as the
notebook on which I am typing now. Rather, we are acquainted with sense
data and with certain abstract entities. Hence, the primitives we mentally
“combine” when we think are either sense data or abstract entities of a
. On the idea of a syntactic mirroring of semantic properties, see K (, pp. –),
who uses it to characterize the notion of a logically perfect language. Fodor writes: «we know from
formal logic that certain of the semantic relations among symbols can be, as it were, “mimicked”
by their syntactic relations; that, when seen from a very great distance, is what proof–theory is
about. So, within certain famous limits, the semantic relation that holds between two symbols when
the proposition expressed by the one is implied by the proposition expressed by the other can be
mimicked by syntactic relations in virtue of which one of the symbols is derivable from the other.
We can therefore build machines which have, again within famous limits, the following property:
the operations of such a machine consist entirely of transformations of symbols; in the course of
performing these operations, the machine is sensitive solely to syntactic properties of the symbols;
and the operations that the machine performs on the symbols are entirely confined to alterations
of their shapes. Yet the machine is so devised that it will transform one symbol into another if
and only if the symbols so transformed stand in certain semantic relations; e.g., the relation that the
premises bear to the conclusion in a valid argument. Such machines – computers, of course – just are
environments in which the causal role of a symbol token is made to parallel the inferential role of the
proposition that it expresses. [. . . ] Computers are a solution to the problem of mediating between
the causal properties of symbols and their semantic properties. So if the mind is a sort of computer,
we begin to see how you can have a theory of mental processes that succeeds where associationism
(to say nothing of behaviorism) abjectly failed; a theory which explains how there could regularly be
nonarbitrary content relations among causally related thoughts» (F, , pp. –).
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certain sort, which are, then, the only constituents of our thoughts. Note,
however, that natural language sentences never contain names for those
very peculiar entities which Russell calls “sense data”. If these sentences are
meaningful, they express a thought, but they express it in a nontransparent
way: their syntactic structure does not mirror the structure of the thought,
since their syntactic primitives (roughly, the words that occur in them) do
not correspond to the constituent of the thought. In fact, as Wittgenstein
famously wrote in the Tractatus:
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense
[. . . ].
Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than
it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language
is.
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the
outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for
entirely different purposes.
The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends
are enormously complicated (Wittgenstein, , prop. .).
We can nevertheless understand natural language sentences, but this
requires a process of analysis, and sometimes the process of analysis goes
wrong, and we end up misunderstanding. This could not happen with
sentences of a logically perfect language, because a sentence of a logically
perfect language requires no analysis: its constituents, which Russell calls
“logically proper names”, would directly stand for the constituents of the
thought it expressed, and its syntactic structure would mirror the logical
form of the thought. If there were a logically perfect language, we could
characterize the analysis, hence the process of understanding, in terms of a
translation: one has to map a natural language sentence, which expresses a
thought “opaquely”, onto a sentence of the logically perfect language that
expresses that same thought “transparently”. But this is exactly what one
does, if Fodor is right and there is a language of thought: one understands
a sentence he or she hears or reads by mapping it onto a sentence of
the language by which he or she thinks, which, obviously, “expresses” a
thought transparently. With regard to this, Fodor is quite explicit, although
his terminology is very different. In discussing «the mechanisms whereby
human beings exchange information via natural languages» (, p. ), and,
. On the idea of analysis as translation (paraphrase) and its historical vicissitudes, see M
().
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more precisely, «the psychological mechanisms involved in understanding
a natural language» (p. n, my italics), he claims that the «the internal
representation of a [natural language] sentence is simply its translation in
the language of thought» (ibidem, my italics). Here is an exemplification:
Suppose that F is that formula of the internal code [the language of thought] which
corresponds to the English sentence ‘There’s an ink–blot on this page’ (hereafter,
‘S’). Then, presumably, understanding tokens of S involves assigning tokens of F as
their internal representations, and believing that a certain token of S is true involves
believing that the corresponding token of F is true. A natural account of what is
involved in believing that a token of F is true is simply that F is taken to be true
in those computations in which it is involved; e.g., that it is treated as a nonlogical
axiom in those computations (Fodor, , p. ).
As I said, as far as I know Fodor never mentions the idea of a logically
perfect language. There is a passage in his  book, however, where he
connects his views about the language of thought and the tradition of which
Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein are illustrious exponents:
The notion that a theory of meaning serves, in effect, to pair natural language sentences
with some sort of canonical representation of their truth conditions is, of course, not
new. It has been in the philosophical literature for as long as philosophers have
distinguished between the surface form of sentences and their ‘logical’ form. Indeed,
the precise point of this distinction has always been that the sentences of a natural
language do not provide appropriate domains for the application of logical rules, but
that some specifiable translations of such sentences would. To represent the logical
form of a sentence is to represent the truth condition of the sentence explicitly, in a
way that the sentence itself fails to do (Fodor, , p. ).
Fodor continues by stressing a “difference” between his account and
“this tradition”. Contrary to the latter, he writes,
we are taking the notion of a canonical representation seriously as part of a psychological
theory; the appropriate canonical representation of a sentence is the one that the
speaker has in mind when he utters the sentence and the hearer recovers when he
understands what the speaker said; i.e., it is that representation which makes explicit
what utterances of the sentence are intended to communicate (Fodor, , p. ).
In my opinion, however, the difference is not so great as Fodor seems
to suggest. I cannot argue for this here, but I believe that Wittgenstein, and
perhaps, more confusedly, Russell, although almost certainly not Frege, con-
ceived of a logically perfect language as something actually involved in the
. Hence, «linguistic and psycholinguistic theories, insofar as they contribute to accounts of
communication, must specify the procedures whereby this translation is affected» (p. ).
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activities of understanding and thinking (What they lacked, in contrast to
Fodor, was, of course, a naturalistic, computational, account of these activities).
Fodor’s is an empirical hypothesis. We do not know yet whether it is
true or false: as I said, it has fierce opponents and staunch defenders (see
Fodor,  for a recent revisitation and development of it). What I have
tried to argue here is only that until we get a clear verdict on it, it would
not be wise to classify the idea of a logically perfect language as another
bizarre product of some excessively creative philosophers. Maybe there is
a logically perfect language, after all. And if there is, we use it all the time,
even though we are not aware of this.
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